Organized crime, political instability and their effects on kidnap and extortion risks

Introduction

While the long‑running wars in Ukraine and the Middle East commanded headlines throughout the year, 2025 brought other significant political and security developments across the globe. From youth‑led protests that toppled governments in Nepal and Madagascar, skirmishes between India and Pakistan, and other conflicts throughout Africa and Southeast Asia, insecurity continues to pose operational challenges to companies and organizations.

Kidnap and extortion risks have evolved alongside many of these developments. In countries that have historically faced higher kidnapping risks, instability has exacerbated the threat. In countries once considered lower risk, unrest at home and abroad has resulted in newly emergent kidnap and extortion threats that governments have struggled to combat effectively.

Kidnap for ransom and extortion are often symptomatic of broader political, social, and economic upheaval. Poor governance, corruption, insecurity, and inequality all create permissive environments for organized criminals and other threat actors to exploit for their own purposes. For threat actors, kidnap for ransom and extortion can be valuable tools to raise money, intimidate local communities, and solidify territorial control at the expense of the government. Latin America and West Africa are emblematic of this dynamic, which is likely to persist as the world enters 2026.

Latin America

Colombia

Although still considered one of the higher risk countries for kidnapping in Latin America, the threat in Colombia has declined significantly over the last two decades. When the Colombian government reached a landmark peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2016, officials reported that kidnappings had declined by 92% since 2000. After his election in 2022, President Gustavo Petro vowed to build on the accords and achieve “total peace” with dissident FARC factions and other left‑ wing rebel groups. Despite Petro’s initial optimism, developments in 2025 have threatened to undo much of the progress Colombia has made in achieving peace – with consequences for the government’s fight against kidnapping and extortion.

In January, President Gustavo Petro suspended peace talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN) after its forces seized the Catatumbo region on the border with Venezuela. After suspending negotiations with the ELN, Petro’s administration then rescinded a ceasefire with dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) amid increasing attacks on government forces. The collapse of peace talks and the surge in fighting between rival militant factions has eroded the gains Colombia has made stabilizing the country’s security situation. By November 2025, the number of kidnappings in Colombia increased by 125% compared to 2024 and remains far above the record lows of 2021.

Catatumbo, still under the control of the ELN, now has the highest kidnapping rate of any department in Colombia. Victims have ranged from cattle ranchers, landowners to small business owners, who are held by armed and criminal groups increasingly driven by a desire for profit and control, rather than political or ideological motives. In addition, extortion has also become widespread, especially in Bogota and other urban areas. Victim profiles have expanded to include hotel, restaurant, and other business owners that criminals deem vulnerable and willing to pay extortion fees.

Over a third of Colombian voters say insecurity, crime and drug trafficking are among their top concerns heading into the country’s May 2026 general election, behind corruption and healthcare. The election has already been marred by resurgent political violence following the assassination of Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay at a rally in Bogota by a gunman ostensibly linked to dissident FARC factions. Petro is term limited, but his party has put their support behind leftist Senator Ivan Cepeda, who must face a crowded presidential field. Cepeda is expected to face questions from voters and rival candidates about Petro’s handling of the total peace initiative and his administration’s failure to make tangible progress on insecurity and corruption.

Peru

Traditionally considered a lower risk country for kidnap and extortion compared to neighboring Colombia and Ecuador, Peru now faces a complex threat environment. The country has become a nexus of various criminal schemes, including illegal mining, drug trafficking in the Amazon basin, and extortion rackets in urban centers. Crime rates spiked during the COVID‑19 pandemic and were further exacerbated by the political crisis brought on by then‑President Pedro Castillo’s failed self‑coup in 2022.

Extortion cases have increased 600% since 2018, targeting small and medium sized business across the capital Lima and other major cities. Businesses that refuse to pay have been subjected to bombings and arson attacks. Extortion‑related homicides have also spiked, with at least 70 public transport drivers murdered in 2025 alone for refusing to pay protection rackets.

Criminal gangs have also expanded into illegal mining to deadly effect. In May 2025, authorities suspended gold mining in Pataz province after 13 miners working for one of Peru’s largest gold mining companies were kidnapped and killed by criminal gangs. The miners were held captive for over a week before they were killed. More than 39 miners have been killed in recent years as illegal mining proliferates, driven by record high gold prices.

Castillo’s successor, President Dina Boluarte, failed to stem rising crime rates, becoming one of the most unpopular and embattled leaders in South America. Critics accused her administration and lawmakers of doing more to protect themselves from corruption investigations by passing new laws that weaken the power of prosecutors and the judiciary, further hampering the state’s ability to combat crime.

In October 2025, Boluarte was impeached and removed from office by Congress amid growing anti‑ government protests and strikes condemning violent crime. Her replacement, Jose Jeri, declared a “war on crime” upon taking office and has promised a wide‑ ranging crackdown on organized crime in Peru. Immediately after assuming office, Jeri took actions to stem the violence by authorizing the military to carryout law enforcement duties and cracking down on gang organizing in Peru’s overcrowded prison system. Despite efforts to stabilize Peru’s security situation, Jeri was impeached and ousted after only four months in office following accusations of corruption, exacerbating the country’s political instability.

Violent crime, including rampant extortion, is likely to focus heavily in Peru’s upcoming election. Peruvian voters, fed up with the ruling establishment, could elect a leader like Ecuador’s Daniel Noboa or El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, two presidents that have enacted sweeping, militarized crackdowns on violent crime, cartels, and street gangs in their respective countries.

In April 2026, right-wing candidate Keiko Fujimori – the daughter of former strongman President Alberto Fujimori – won the first round of Peru’s general election. A perennial candidate over the last 15 years, Fujimori has promised sweeping security reforms if she wins the June runoff, including imprisonment for members of the military and tighter border security measures. Other candidates across the political spectrum have taken tough on crime stances as Peru’s homicide rate continues to climb. Regardless of the election’s outcome, Peru’s next president is likely to struggle to stem rising crime, which has been exacerbated by the country’s weak institutions, systemic corruption, and economic inequality.

West Africa

The Sahel region of West Africa, prone to militant insurgencies and coups, remains a source of significant insecurity. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have borne the brunt of worsening insurgencies by al‑ Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates, which reached new levels of violence in 2025.

Niger previously enjoyed lower levels of militancy and reduced kidnap risks compared with neighboring Nigeria, Mali and Burkina Faso, but instability following a 2023 coup has reversed this trend. The Islamic State and other militant organizations, already strengthened by recent territorial gains in Burkina Faso and Mali, have exploited Niger’s political turmoil and frayed military ties with France and the U.S. Attacks have escalated over the last two years, targeting security forces and civilians alike across western and central Niger.

Militants increasingly sought to kidnap foreign nationals in Niger in 2025, carrying out multiple high‑ profile abductions throughout the year. These include the kidnapping of two Chinese technicians in the Agadem oil field, the abduction of five Indian nationals working on a dam in the Tillaberi region, and others. In many cases, victims have been kidnapped after militants attacked and killed the security forces tasked with escorting them and ensuring safety on job sites.

While most abductions have occurred in more rural areas, several incidents have occurred in Niger’s major cities. In January, gunmen kidnapped an Austrian and Swiss aid worker from their homes in Agadez, while in October, a U.S. pilot working for a religious aid group was kidnapped from the capital Niamey.

The kidnap for ransom threat is expected to persist throughout Niger and the wider Sahel region in 2026 as extremist militants continue their advance. Nothing has exemplified the growing risk more than the alleged $50m ransom paid by the United Arab Emirates in October 2025 for the release of two of its citizens – including a member of the al‑Maktoum royal family – who were kidnapped in Mali. The ransom, paid to al‑Qaeda’s local affiliate JNIM, is among the largest known ransoms in West Africa and included the release of multiple al‑Qaeda militants held in Malian prisons. The abductions occurred as JNIM militants have imposed an economic blockade of the capital Bamako, attacking food and fuel shipments in a bid to seize power from the military‑led government.

The encirclement of Bamako has raised fears that Mali could become the first West African state to fall to al‑Qaeda militants, a development that could have potentially severe implications for its neighbors. Bordering countries like Senegal, Guinea, and Ivory Coast have enjoyed relative stability in a region otherwise known for high rates of crime, terrorism and kidnapping. As extremist militants expand their reach across Mali and the Sahel, they may seek to destabilize the border frontiers of neighboring states via armed violence, extortion, kidnapping, and other schemes to raise revenue and increase their control over local communities.

Special crime insurance as risk mitigation

Special crime coverage – also known as kidnap and ransom insurance – remains an essential component of an organization’s crisis management plan as they address the challenges that come with operating in high‑risk security environments. By providing access to a dedicated crisis response firm, special crime coverage can be engaged quickly to aid in resolving kidnap and extortion threats.

As worldwide coverage, special crime insurance is well placed to respond to changing threat environments as risks shift between countries, ensuring organizations are not left exposed if security conditions suddenly deteriorate. This has become evident across Latin America in recent years where countries once considered lower risk are struggling to combat the spread of organized crime from neighboring states.

Coverage can also be expanded beyond the core perils to include other risks, including security evacuation for business travelers and expatriates. This coverage has become a key component of special crime programs in recent years as businesses contend with the threat of civil unrest, armed conflict, and other destabilizing social and political developments in countries that they operate in. War between nuclear‑armed India and Pakistan, the Israel‑Iran war, and Gen‑Z‑led protests that toppled governments in Nepal and Madagascar underscored the relevancy of such coverage again in 2025.