Limiting the greenhouse gasses responsible for climate change could represent the most significant realignment of the global economy since the industrial revolution.
Efforts will change production processes, supply chains, technology, customer preferences, use of natural resources, as well as costs, prices, employment and asset valuations.
Some analysts argue that the net impact of a climate-related energy transition on overall global economic growth could be negligible or even positive - albeit with substantial distributional effects between sectors and regions.
These analyses ignore the impact of misaligned action with respect to energy use, supply, and technology, even though uncoordinated action appears increasingly likely.
In fact, from a business perspective, it is best to assume the transition is going to be disorderly.
This should therefore be top of the agenda for risk managers if they are to help minimise the negative effects of a ‘chaotic’ transition.
What is a disorderly transition?
An “orderly transition” to a low-carbon economy would entail a perfect match between the retirement of existing high-carbon assets and the deployment of low-cost, carbon-free replacement resources.
Such a match ensures that throughout the transition the needs of consumers and suppliers are met, avoiding shortages of energy, food or consumer goods and industrial products, while preventing waste from excess supply or unneeded investment.
A disorderly transition, then, is a mismatch that occurs when there are:
- Stranded assets: Where the phase-in of new assets occurs before existing resources and assets are fully amortised.
- Shortages: Where replacement assets are developed and deployed too late to meet market demand to replace the output from the retired assets.
Why we’re on track for a disorderly transition
Long-run expectations for oil and coal demand have fallen significantly over the last 20 years.
As a result, oil companies are increasingly reluctant to invest in capital-intensive projects that may take years to produce their first oil and will continue to produce well into the 2040s. The risk of committing large sums is too high.
Instead, they are already shifting investment to shorter term, higher operating cost, lower capital cost investments that produce oil relatively quickly and amortise their investment in a short period of time. These fields are often higher cost, reinforcing the trend to higher commodity price volatility and costs.
Figure 1 shows that the supply curve for potential oil production in 2030 shifted downwards from January 2021 to January 2022, but market expectations for 2030 demand stayed largely static.
Consequently, our forecasts show that without accelerated development of alternative energy supplies and efficiency, energy prices would be between $25 and $30/barrel higher for most of the next two decades.
The below figures (1a - 1c) show that the supply curve for potential oil production in 2030 shifted downwards from January 2021 to January 2022, but market expectations for 2030 demand stayed largely static.



