The unknown is scary, but what we understand is often less so. With climate change, we have both a growing base of knowledge (on drivers, impacts) and yet many unknowns (e.g., tipping points, feedback loops and dependency on projected emissions). There is a growing recognition that all this knowledge, while taken seriously, is not resulting in the urgent action needed to adapt to and mitigate climate change. What is missing? The answer has more to do with psychology and culture than with science.
The ‘levee effect’ or a false sense of security
In the 18th century, the Enlightenment ushered a wave of scientific progress, faith in knowledge and reason, and the belief that by understanding the universe, humans can improve their own condition. We have this urge to rationalize, categorize and quantify, and we get comfort that this knowledge somehow tames the natural world.
Up to a point. Improved understanding of natural phenomena (evidenced by risk maps, estimation of frequencies and severities, etc.) has underpinned the development of insurance, which provides a cushion against adverse events, allowing individuals, communities and organizations to recover and thrive after a flood or a storm.
Tremendous progress in the science of risk has improved our knowledge, but has this investment in modelling, quantification, prediction given us a false sense of security? This is akin to the “levee effect,” the paradox that the construction of a levee to protect an area from flooding might encourage owners to invest more in their property, thereby increasing the potential damages in case the levee is breached.
Even one of the Enlightenment philosophers saw his optimism shaken by the 1755 Lisbon earthquake and tsunami. Shortly after, Voltaire wrote Candide ou l’optimisme, an unrelenting satirical novel attacking the optimism of Leibniz that we live in the “best of all possible worlds.”
How can science help with the ‘unprecedented’?
The risk management and insurance professions have become very reliant on risk models and risk probabilities. Existing tooling and ways of thinking are constraining adaptation to “unprecedented” changes or events, with typical responses such as:
- Incremental adjustments to the frequency and severity assumptions of existing risk models for risks impacted by climate change (e.g., flood) – but what about tipping points?
- Continued underestimation of compounding risks – even with the proliferation of models, there are still glaring gaps and vast areas of unmodeled perils, e.g., wildfire
- Continued reliance on a terminology (“1 in 100-year flood”) that is misunderstood by the public and decision makers, limited by historical records, and statements that would need to be constantly readjusted because of other factors (e.g., growing exposure in areas at risk, climate change…)
Without meaningful complementary strategic action, these tweaks are akin to (well-meaning) analysis paralysis. As amusingly put by James Vaccaro, member of the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero advisory panel, “If you’re driving towards the edge of a cliff, it’s probably less important to calibrate instruments that will give you an accurate reading on how far you will fall and more important to steer in a different direction”.



