In early November, Somali pirates attempted several boardings in the Indian Ocean, marking the first such activity since the hijackings of MV Ruen in December 2023 and MV Abdullah in March 2024. These and other recent incidents have revived familiar tactics – such as the use of motherships, fast skiffs and small arms attacks – which, unfortunately for the shipping community, further complicate an already challenging strategic environment as regional conflicts and geopolitical maneuvering have significantly affected freedom of navigation and seafarer safety in recent years. This article outlines what has occurred, the current situation, the longer-term implications and practical mitigation measures for the maritime sector.
At the start of November, following the seizure of the Iranian-flagged dhow MV Issa Mohamadi on 28 October, multiple suspicious approaches and at least one confirmed boarding were reported in the Somali Basin and the adjacent western Indian Ocean. Attackers used small, high-speed skiffs launched from larger support vessels, also known as motherships, to approach commercial ships. In the most prominent case, the product tanker MV Hellas Aphrodite was approached, came under fire from small arms and rocket-propelled grenades and was boarded. The crew sheltered in a citadel while Spanish naval forces, as part of the EU counter-piracy mission Operation Atalanta, coordinated a response that secured the vessel and confirmed the crew’s safety after approximately 30 hours. The pirates, unable to secure hostages, vacated the Hellas Aphrodite sometime before the Spanish Navy reached the vessel and rescued the crew. Subsequently, they attempted to board another vessel, the Marshall Islands-flagged tanker MT Al Thumama, which managed to evade their boarding attempt.
The Iranian-flagged mothership used by the pirates was later abandoned and boarded by Operation Atalanta forces, aided by an Indian naval asset operating in the area, securing the Iranian crew. The pirates are believed to have been monitored returning to Somalia, ending the presence of any known active Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) in the Indian Ocean for now. However, these recent events highlight that the presence, intent and capability of Somali pirates remain very much alive.
The recent resurgence of Somali piracy has sent a clear signal to international naval forces and the shipping community: pirates remain active and capable, and Best Management Practice (BMP) defensive measures – such as armed guards, vessel hardening and robust procedures – are still effective deterrents. Notably, these measures were instrumental in protecting the crews of the MV Stolt Sagaland and MV Hellas Aphrodite during recent attacks.
However, these incidents have also demonstrated that PAGs are able to operate at range and can successfully board vessels, likely galvanizing them. With slightly more luck — or a less prepared target — the outcome could have been far more severe. While another PAG operation is unlikely in the immediate term due to heightened international naval vigilance, the medium- to long-term risk of further pirate activity in the Indian Ocean remains highly plausible.
These events will be unwelcome at a time when commercial shipping has already been significantly impacted by Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and instability across the region, placing considerable strain on operators and crew. This comes during a period of uncertainty, as within days of these attacks, the Houthis signaled they may cease attacks on vessels, and Iran seized a Marshall Islands oil tanker, the MT Talara, in the Strait of Hormuz. Previous incidents like this seizure of the MT Talara have often been in response to geopolitical pressure on Iran. The recent increase in sanctions on Iran — the JCPOA (Iran Deal) snapback mechanism that came into force on 27 September 2025 – could lead to a return of Iranian harassment of vessels.
It is too early to validate the Houthi position, as their announcement of a halt to attacks is based on a single, translated source. This should therefore be viewed with caution, given their history of ceasefire violations and the likelihood of continued Israeli military action. Similarly, it remains to be seen whether the MT Talara incident signals a broader trend of increased Iranian harassment in the Strait of Hormuz. Nonetheless, these pirate events and the continued Houthi and Iranian concerns compound the situation for those conducting shipping operations in the Middle East and Indian Ocean.
While the naval response will have intensified in the immediate term, the need for traditional counter-piracy BMP measures when operating in the region has been highlighted and proven effective in these recent incidents. This comes at a time when focus had shifted more toward countering Houthi attack methods, such as missiles and drones.
These events have highlighted the need to:
These Somali piracy incidents are a stark reminder that maritime security gains are reversible. The operational methods are familiar, but the strategic backdrop is different: diverted naval focus, regional instability and mothership-enabled reach increase both the risk and potential cost. Short-term resilience depends on disciplined application of BMP, layered vessel hardening, real-time intelligence and coordinated naval responses. Long-term resolution requires investment in regional capacity, legal follow-through and economic measures ashore to remove the incentives that drive piracy. Operators, insurers and policymakers should treat the current uptick as a prompt to strengthen controls now, rather than wait for future rounds of pirate activity.
To find out more about we can help you navigate these complex maritime security challenges, contact our team.
