No-one should doubt that we are living in a world that has been radically re-shaped in the past decade. The emergence of new political agendas, rapid technology development and the willingness of states to act against each other overtly and covertly, have all impacted the underpinnings of national security and the world economy.
For those whose business is understanding and managing risk on a global scale, the five topics below represent the most significant items on the risk register.
01
For both business and individuals, national security issues have moved from the margins to the mainstream. While it might once have been possible to ignore its effects, the impacts are these days far more keenly felt.
At times, national security can feel like a tidal wave. It is the justification for tariffs, the cause of cyber-attacks and behind the scramble for the Arctic.
In the ‘grey zone’, states are testing cyber and physical defences, probing boundaries that exist below the threshold of war and increasingly below the ocean’s surface.
Far from existing in a vacuum, these risks cascade to create a multi-layered landscape where threats are combining to impact governments, their citizens and global trade.
Great power competition for dominance in AI threatens labour market dislocation and can impact social norms. The high energy demand required of data centres and technology accelerates climate change, in turn driving global migration.
The shocks and threats weathered thus far by global supply chains is testament to their resilience but it is clear to see that, in a world where rules are being rewritten, predictability is an increasingly precious commodity.
02
The changing role of the United States in both international relations and trade is at the heart of many of the biggest geopolitical shifts taking place.
States that have long relied on – and in some cases taken for granted – US security and defence guarantees, are increasingly considering their positions and how much these might need to change.
In some regions of the world this has led to nations looking to hedge their risk between other influential powers, potentially increasing global political uncertainty for traditionally allied nations.
How best to prepare for and facilitate an orderly US withdrawal from European defence - whilst not actively precipitating it - is preoccupying defence analysts and security agencies.
As has been widely reported, European countries have responded to the changes by promising to increase defence spending though, in some cases, rhetoric continues to outstrip concrete action.
Intelligence, for so long at the heart of the US-Europe defence relationship, is coming under particular strain, with genuine anxiety around the re-tooling of US agencies away from common goals towards local priorities that European countries in particular do not share.
03
The relationship between China and the United States remains the biggest and perhaps the most unpredictable of all the geopolitical risks visible today.
Analysts commonly identify three future scenarios: first, after much haggling, the two countries sign a trade deal. Second, they fight an all-out war. The third - and most likely - scenario is a continuation of the current messy relationship.
The real battle is economic, with trade deeply connected to national security. The end of the globalised liberal economic order is blurring the lines between politics and trade, putting business on the front line.
These patterns of engagement are already visible in the two countries probing for dependencies and weaknesses that can be weaponised to gain advantage. For example, when the US restricted exports of high-performance semiconductors, China restricted sales of rare earth metals used in many US industries.
Such developments also create waves of disruption across supply chains, carrying everything from commodities to consumer goods. While the search for long term advantage continues, the two countries have effectively called a truce.
There has been no major decoupling of trade despite proliferating tariffs and most observers expect the uneasy calm to continue, whilst at the same time China increases its trade flows to the rest of world.
04
It took the rise of the first wave of Chinese technology giants for western countries to recognise that the country could, in time, out-innovate them. With the US and Europe used to the home field advantage in supplying digital technology and infrastructure, the ability of China to disrupt established markets created shockwaves.
Today another rise of Chinese technology is worrying the west and causing some to ask if the end of western technology dominance is within sight. The early-stage battle for control of AI chips illustrates the high stakes of technology transition and how difficult it will be in practice to control the shift to an AI economy.
If Washington accepts that regulation is appropriate to restrain the shape and direction of AI development, the US could lose market dominance because opposition nations will not be constrained by such rules.
Sovereign AI capability is considered vital to maintaining strong national security, a dominant military and to project economic power. Its critics point out that this leaves potential downsides, from labour market risks to the ability of states to defend themselves against vagaries of the market.
05
One of the places in which the new world order is most visible is the Arctic. Recent geopolitical changes have already resulted in territorial claims and a revival of the notion of spheres of influence.
Increasingly assertive nations see the Arctic as vital for the projection of military strength. This return to a cold war model of stand-off and confrontation has brought military planning for ocean risk back into vogue after decades of relative calm.
The Arctic is also a location where the impact of climate change can be closely observed and measured in political and environmental terms. The withdrawal of sea ice leaves Arctic nations with more territory to defend, more resources to exploit and more sea area to manage.
Naturally the appeal of the Arctic goes beyond the immediately adjacent nations towards countries who see a longer-term advantage in positioning themselves to share the region’s potential.
China considers itself a ‘near-Arctic State’ and has made no secret of its interest in building a polar Silk Road to enable it to cut days off Asia-Europe transit times, bypassing the southerly transit through the higher risk waters of the Red Sea and Suez Canal.
There is little comfort in the observation that global risk is arguably higher in 2025 than any time in the last 25 years - the chances of the temperature cooling markedly in the decade to come appear to be decreasing.
Optimism certainly exists; the introduction of AI may take place in an orderly manner, nations generally prefer trade to conflict and compromise is inimical to international relations. The interplay of these factors provides the backdrop for the next 25 years and beyond.
